The Cultural Significance of Wildlife: Using the National Historic Preservation Act to Protect Iconic Species by Brostrom, Ingrid
Hastings Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 12 
Number 2 Spring 2006 Article 5 
1-1-2006 
The Cultural Significance of Wildlife: Using the National Historic 
Preservation Act to Protect Iconic Species 
Ingrid Brostrom 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_environmental_law_journal 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ingrid Brostrom, The Cultural Significance of Wildlife: Using the National Historic Preservation Act to 
Protect Iconic Species, 12 Hastings West Northwest J. of Envtl. L. & Pol'y 147 (2006) 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_environmental_law_journal/vol12/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings 













I have raised my children from the gifts
from this sea. 
It’s our mission to pass this treasure to
our offspring.1
- Oba San, 92-year-old
Okinawan protestor
I.  Introduction
Whether it be the emblematic bald
eagle flying majestically overhead or the
spawning salmon winding its way
upstream, certain animals represent the
cultural backbone of a people and bring
meaning to the human world around
them.  A community can survive without
these species but its unique cultural iden-
tity may not.  While every species has bio-
logical and ecological value, some
deserve extra protection for the signifi-
cance they derive from the human popu-
lations around them.
This note examines the cultural sig-
nificance of wildlife and how the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA or “Act”)
can be used to protect culturally signifi-
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cant species.  This paper presents the cur-
rent battle of the Okinawan people to pro-
tect one of their national icons—the
dugong, an animal that has shaped the
mythology and history of their small
island for centuries.  Section II (A) dis-
cusses the general evolution of cultural
laws which have steadily become more
inclusive and prevalent as people and
governments come to appreciate the
value of cultural identity and heritage.
Next, section II (B) examines the cultural
importance of wildlife in general and why
certain animal species should be protect-
ed under cultural preservation laws
because of their specific contributions to
the cultural heritage of many traditional
societies.  The next two sections describe
in more detail the policy and procedures
of the National Historic Preservation Act
and how it can be applied to protect
wildlife in the United States.  The second
half of the note applies this reasoning to
Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld2 and concludes
that the U.S. failed to meet its obligations
under the NHPA with regard to the
Okinawa dugong.  The last section explores
the ramifications and potential usefulness
of the NHPA both in the U.S. and abroad by
discussing the applicability of the court’s
ruling in Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld to other
culturally significant species.
II. Background 
A. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld
According to legend, dugongs3
fooled desperately lonely sailors into mis-
taking them for mermaids.4 Today, in
Okinawa, these huge relatives of the man-
atee are themselves in danger of disap-
pearing into mythology.  In fact, Okinawa’s
dugong population is teetering on the
brink of extinction, confined to a single
bay off the east coast of the island.
Residents throughout northeast
Okinawa,5 led by local village elders, are
engaged in an intense battle to protect
this only remaining natural dugong habi-
tat in Japanese waters from becoming the
latest U.S. military airbase, complete with
floating helipad.  The villagers have
organized a protracted sit-in at the site of
the proposed military base, which has
slowed construction since April 19, 2004.6
Once preliminary seabed drilling began in
December 2004, the villagers further
attempted to stall the construction by
canoeing out to the drilling sites daily to
protest the destruction of coral habitat.  A
70-year-old protester, who recently
learned to paddle a canoe as part of her
effort in the protest, said that it had “been
a life-threatening experience for me but I
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1.  ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT WATCH GROUP FOR
THE DUGONGS IN OKINAWA, LET THE SEA STAIN OUR
HEARTS (June 16, 2004).
2.  Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005).
3.  The dugong (Dugong dugon) is a large sea-
mammal distantly related to the manatee.
4.  It is theorized that the dugong’s mammary
glands which are reminiscent of human breasts
may have caused sailors to mistake them for mer-
maids or sirens.  ARKive: Images of Life on Earth,
Dugong Facts,
http://www.arkive.org/species/GES/mammals/Dug
ong_dugon/more_info.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2006); see also Dennis Pfaff, ‘Historic’ Act May Keep Sea
Creature From Being History, THE DAILY JOURNAL, Apr. 8,
2004, available at http://www.mongabay.com/exter-
nal/okinawa_dugong.htm (last visited Mar. 20,
2006).
5.  Okinawa is an island 1,000 miles southwest
of Tokyo, at the southern edge of Japan.
6.  Environment News Service, Reef Experts
Object to U.S. Military Heliport off Okinawa, July 9,
2004, available at http://www.ens-
n e w s w i r e . c o m / e n s / j u l 2 0 0 4 / 2 0 0 4 - 0 7 - 0 9 -
09.asp#anchor3 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
them from making a new military base,
what’s the meaning of my life?”7 That
same month, a 64-year-old Okinawan
woman began a hunger strike, vowing to
starve herself until Tokyo stopped boring
holes into the seabed.8 She told reporters
that “before the vast power of the nation-
al government, our struggle is like a war of
ants against a huge elephant,” but
declared she would do all she could as
long as her strength held up.9 To these
villagers, the fight is not only about saving
a unique and rare species.  It is about pro-
tecting their way of life and preserving a
cultural icon that has become a fixture of
Okinawan tradition over hundreds of
years.
The battle between the villagers of
Okinawa and the Japanese and U.S. gov-
ernments stems from a 1995 agreement
between the two governments to replace
the existing Futenma10 U.S. military base
with a sea-based facility off the east coast
of Okinawa.11 In 2002, the two govern-
ments agreed on Henoko Bay as the most
suitable location for the base.  Henoko
Bay lies atop a fragile coral reef ecosystem
and sea grass beds that serve as a critical
feeding ground for the small and isolated
group of dugong that remain in Japan.
While the protestors may have a diffi-
cult time beating elephants as large as the
U.S. and Japanese governments when it
comes to sheer power, they hope to gain
an advantage with a strategic maneuver
that, in late 2003, moved the battle from
the home front in Japan to the jurisdiction
of the U.S. courts.  A number of conserva-
tion organizations from both the U.S. and
Japan, along with several individual
Japanese citizens, filed suit in the
Northern District of California alleging
that the U.S. government failed to comply
with the NHPA by neglecting to take into
account the presence of the dugong
before beginning construction on the new
base.12 The Act specifically mandates
that the U.S. consider the effect of any
international undertaking that may
adversely affect a property which is on the
applicable country’s equivalent of the
National Register of Historic Places13
(“National Register”) for the purposes of
avoiding or mitigating any adverse
affects.14 The dugong is a protected mon-
ument under the Japanese Register of
Cultural properties, a designation which
serves to protect historic and cultural arti-
facts and properties, much in the same way
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7.  Chiyomi Sumida, Okinawan Begins Hunger
Strike to Protest Plans for New Base, STARS AND STRIPES,
Dec. 7, 2004, available at http://www.estripes.com/
article.asp?section=104&article=24987&archive=tr
ue (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
8.  Id.
9.  Id.
10.  Futenma Air Station, home base for
Marine Air Group 36, is one of the preeminent
Marine Corps air stations in Japan, located in the
center of Ginowen City.  See Military Base Affairs




11.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan,
The SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station (an inte-
gral part of the SACO Final Report), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/securi-
ty/96saco2.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
12.  See Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-
4350, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2005).
13.  The National Register is a list of historic
properties composed of districts, sites, buildings,
structures, and objects significant in American his-
tory, architecture, archeology, engineering, and
culture.  See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
14. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2000).
B. Cultural Preservation in Law
Culture serves to connect one gener-
ation to another and has an inherent
capacity to mold and reinforce our identi-
ties as social creatures.15 But as bound-
aries between traditional and modern
societies have gradually faded away, many
communities are pressured to abandon
their long-established traditions in favor
of new, trendier lifestyles.  Even the most
tucked away and forgotten societies have
faced the encroachment of modern and
westernized values.  Faced with a pressing
need to protect the heritage and identity
of all communities, governments have
recognized their role in protecting tradi-
tions by adopting a series of international
and domestic obligations and laws to pre-
serve and revitalize culture.
“Culture” has been defined as “the
traditions, beliefs, practices, lifeways, arts,
crafts, and social institutions of any com-
munity, be it an Indian tribe, a local ethnic
group, or the people of the nation as a
whole.”16 The international community
has acknowledged that cultural identity is
a fundamental human right, integrating it
into human rights laws.  The Draft United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples includes several pro-
visions on the preservation of cultural her-
itage.  Article 12 recognizes that:
Indigenous peoples have the
right to practice and revitalize
their cultural traditions and cus-
toms.  This includes the right to
maintain, protect and develop
the past, present and future
manifestations of their cultures,
such as archaeological and his-
torical sites, artifacts, designs,
ceremonies, technologies and
visual and performing arts and
literature.17
Article 25 further provides that:
Indigenous peoples have the
right to maintain and strengthen
their distinctive spiritual and
material relationship with the
lands, territories, waters and
coastal seas and other resources
which they have traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or
used, and to uphold their
responsibilities to future gener-
ations in this regard.18
International environmental treaties
have also contemplated the special role
the natural environment plays in many
traditional societies.  The Convention on
Biological Diversity includes a provision
that mandates that each party to the
treaty respect and preserve indigenous
traditional knowledge within the frame-
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15.  NAT’L PARK SERV., A.1. NPS-28: CULTURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINE (June 11, 1998)
[hereinafter NPS-28].
16.  See Patricia L. Parker and Thomas King,
Nat’l Park Serv., Guidelines for Evaluating and
Documenting Traditional Cultural Properties, 1 National
Register Bulletin 38, available at http://
www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/nrb38/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006) [hereinafter National
Register Bulletin 38]; see also NPS-28, supra note 15.
17.  U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC],
Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Report of the Sub-Commission on the
Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of
Minorities, 46th Sess., Annex., at 115, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2 (1995), E/CN.4/Sub.2/56 (1994).
18.  Id. at art. 25.  See also arts. 13, 14 (protect-
ing cultural heritage).
19.  United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, Convention on
Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992,
art. 8(j), 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).  The U.S. has signed
Spring 2006 The Cultural Significance of Wildlife
While the U.S. is not bound by either
of these agreements, they are party to the
UNESCO World Heritage Convention
which stipulates that 
To ensure that effective and
active measures are taken for the
protection, conservation and
presentation of the cultural and
natural heritage situated on its
territory, each State Party to this
Convention shall endeavor, in so
far as possible, and as appropri-
ate for each country:
a. to adopt a general policy
which aims to give the cultur-
al and natural heritage a func-
tion in the life of the commu-
nity and to integrate the pro-
tection of that heritage into
comprehensive planning pro-
grammes.20
The U.S. satisfies its responsibility
under the UNESCO World Heritage
Convention through its implementation of
the NHPA, which is discussed in detail below.
C. The Cultural Significance of Wildlife
When most people think of iconic
species, the first thing that comes to mind
is the bald eagle, a symbol of the
strength and freedom of America.21
Often, however, the significance of cer-
tain species transcends mere symbolism
to embody deeply held religious and tra-
ditional beliefs.  Throughout history, cul-
tures have evolved with the environment
around them, making associations with
those resources they depend on most.
For example, the nomadic Moken people
of Myanmar value the turtle not only as a
food staple but a symbol of the female
spirit in rituals and practices.22 The turtle
is sanctified in the community’s most
sacred rituals, such as when a shaman
tastes the head, blood, and flippers of a
fresh turtle before asking favors from his
ancestors and translating their replies for
the community.23 When a Moken har-
poons a turtle, it is a sign that he will soon
marry a woman.24 If the turtle were to
become extinct, so too would many of the
unique traditions and rituals of the Moken
belief system.
Closer to home, animals have taken
on a special significance for many Native
American cultures.  According to Iroquois
mythology, the land now known as North
America was formed
when the Sky-Woman fell
through a hole in the sky.  At that
time, the earth was covered with
water.  The creatures living in the
water looked up and saw her
falling and realized that they
needed to make a place for her
to land.  The great turtle offered
his back.  The duck said that
there must be earth on turtle’s













but not yet ratified this treaty.
20.  U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, World Heritage Comm., 27th Sess.,
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural
and Natural Heritage: Decisions Adopted by the 27th Sess.,
art. 5 U.N. Doc. WHC-03/27.COM/24 (Dec. 10,
2003), available at http://whc.unesco.org/
archive/decrec03.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2006).
21.  Home of Heroes.com, The Bald Eagle Symbol
of the United States, http://www.homeofheroes.com/
hallofheroes/1st_floor/flag/1bfc_eagle.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2006).
22.  Jacques Ivanoff, Sea Gypsies of Myanmar,
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, April 2005, at 49.
23.  Id.
24.  Id.
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but could not dive deep enough.
Loon and beaver both tried, but
they could not reach the bottom
either.  Finally, muskrat was able
to reach the bottom and bring
back a small piece of earth,
which, when he placed it on tur-
tle’s back, grew larger until it
became the whole world.  A pair
of swans flew up to catch Sky-
Woman and set her down gently
on the earth on turtle’s back.25
That the tribe attributes the creation
of North America to the benevolence of
animals is typical of how many indige-
nous cultures view the interrelationship
between animals and humans as being
harmonious rather than contentious, and
integral rather than separate.  According
to Ronald Trosper, Director of the
National Indian Policy Center at George
Washington University, many indigenous
cultures of North America have
a perception of the earth as an
animate being; a belief that
humans are in a kinship system
with other living things; a per-
ception of the land as essential
to the identity of the people; a
concept of reciprocity and bal-
ance that extends to relation-
ships among humans, including
future generations, and between
humans and the natural world.26
For many indigenous cultures, the
most sacred places are those that have
not been disrupted by human activity—
those places where the web of life flour-
ishes unscathed.27 From eagles to wolves
and salmon to buffalo, particular species
have heightened spiritual and cultural
status in Native American societies.
These and other species are valued not
only for their ecological importance but
are critical to the cultural survival of many
traditional lifestyles by providing subsis-
tence, spiritual healing, religious symbol-
ism and ceremonial artifacts.28 For the
Gwitchen Indians of Canada and Alaska,
the survival of a caribou herd is essential
to their culture and way of life.  Sarah
James, a Gwitchen leader in Arctic Village,
Alaska, explains that “the caribou is not
just what we eat; it’s who we are.  It is in
our dances, stories, songs, and the whole
way we see the world.”29
Difficulties arise when agencies, act-
ing pursuant to U.S. laws and regulations,
fail to take into account traditional world-
views in deciding which animal species
deserve protection.  Some populations of
animals that are not threatened or endan-
gered may still be of critical importance to
the survival of traditional beliefs and prac-
tices.  If a species is valued not for its eco-
logical role, but for its significance to a
human population, environmental laws
such as the Endangered Species Act (ESA)
will be insufficient to protect it.
Indigenous communities have criticized
the ESA for its failure to address tribal
issues or recognize an ecosystem













25.  Dean B. Suagee, The Cultural Heritage of
American Indian Tribes and the Preservation of Biological
Diversity, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 483, 485 (1999) (citing
JOSEPH BRUCHAC, IROQUOIS STORIES: HEROES AND
HEROINES, MONSTERS AND MAGIC 15-17 (1985)).
26.  Id. at 488 (citing Ronald Trosper, Traditional
American Indian Economic Policy, 19 AM. INDIAN
CULTURE & RES. J. 65, 67 (1995)).
27.  Suagee, supra note 25, at 487.
28.  Id.
29.  Canadian Embassy, Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge: Protecting a Traditional Way of Life,
http://www.canadianembassy.org/environment/gwi
tchin-en.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2006).













relationship between different life-
forms.30 A more appropriate legal tool to
protect culturally significant animals is
the National Historic Preservation Act,
which serves to protect historic and cul-
turally significant resources and proper-
ties.  The NHPA, recognizing that “the his-
torical and cultural foundations of the
Nation should be preserved as a living
part of our community life and develop-
ment in order to give a sense of orienta-
tion to the American people,”31 provides a
mechanism to protect iconic and cultural-
ly significant species.
D. NHPA Policy and Procedure
Congress enacted the NHPA in 1966 to
establish “the policy of the Federal
Government . . . [to] provide leadership in
the preservation of the prehistoric and his-
toric resources of the U.S. and of the inter-
national community of nations.”32 The
NHPA creates a process similar to that used
in the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969,33 whereby federal agencies must con-
sider the effect on any property listed on
the National Register of Historic Places
before they authorize or fund a project.34
The statute grants the Secretary of the
Interior the authority to maintain a
National Register “composed of districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects sig-
nificant in American history, architecture,
archeology, engineering, and culture.”35
In 1980, in order to implement U.S.
obligations under the Convention
Concerning the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage (“World
Heritage Convention”), Congress enacted
section 402 of the NHPA to mitigate
adverse affects to cultural artifacts stem-
ming from federal undertakings outside
the U.S.  Section 402a-2 provides:
[p]rior to the approval of any
Federal undertaking outside the
United States which may directly
and adversely affect a property
which is on the World Heritage
List or on the applicable coun-
try’s equivalent of the National
Register, the head of a Federal
agency having direct or indirect
jurisdiction over such undertak-
ing shall take into account the
effect of the undertaking on such
property for purposes of avoid-
ing or mitigating any adverse
effects.36
The Secretary of the Interior in 1998
developed guidelines to help agencies
conform to section 402a-2.  While not
binding on agencies, the guidelines
explain that “efforts to identify and con-
sider effects on historic properties in
other countries should be carried out in
consultation with the host country’s his-
toric preservation authorities, with affect-
ed communities and groups, and with rel-
evant professional organizations.”37
Thus, using similar procedures as for
domestic projects, agencies are obligated
to consider adverse effects and instructed
to consult with foreign bodies before
undertaking any international action.
30.  Suagee, supra note 25, at 515.
31.  16 U.S.C. § 470b-2 (2000).
32.  Id. § 470-1(2).
33.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2000).
34.  GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS, ET AL., FEDERAL
PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 1052 (5th ed. 2002).
35.  16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
36.  Id. § 470a-2.
37.  The Secretary of the Interior’s Standards
and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic
Preservation Programs Pursuant to the National
Historic Preservation Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,496,
20,504 (April 24, 1998).













E. Using NHPA to Protect Wildlife
Though NHPA provides that “proper-
ties of traditional religious and cultural
importance to an indigenous group may
be determined to be eligible for inclusion
in the National Register,”38 cultural prop-
erties were rarely protected prior to the
1980s.  During these early years, the dom-
inant federal agency view of the role of the
NHPA as protecting only those properties
impressive to academics and profession-
als gave rise to an elitist pattern of pro-
tection.  This agency interpretation was
fundamentally at odds with the NHPA’s
mandate to preserve the “cultural founda-
tions of the Nation” in order to “give a
sense of orientation to the American peo-
ple.”39 The National Park Service (NPS)
and the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation (ACHP) became increasingly
concerned that places of traditional cul-
tural importance were being inappropri-
ately regarded as ineligible for the
National Register because they were not
of historical interest to professional
archeologists, historians, and architectur-
al historians.40 To address this concern,
the agencies drafted National Register
Bulletin 38 (“Bulletin 38”) in 1990 to
define traditional cultural properties and
to clarify that “wholly natural places can
be found eligible for the National Register
if they are ascribed cultural significance
by living communities based on tradition-
al beliefs.”41
Even though traditional cultural
properties are increasingly being protect-
ed under the NHPA, the plain language of
the statute precludes the listing of any
animal species (even those with special
cultural significance) on the National
Register.  The Act is designed and written
to protect and preserve specific categories
of historic property.  Regulations imple-
menting NHPA define historic property as
“any prehistoric or historic district, site,
building, structure, or object included in,
or eligible for inclusion in, the National
Register of Historic Places maintained by
the Secretary of the Interior.”42 The basic
criteria used to determine whether or not
a specific property is eligible for inclusion
on the National Register is whether:
The quality of significance in
American history, architecture,
archeology, engineering, and
culture is present in districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and
objects that possess integrity of
location, design, setting, materi-
als, workmanship, feeling, and
association, and:
A.  that are associated with
events that have made a signifi-
cant contribution to the broad
patterns of our history; or
B.  that are associated with the
lives of significant persons in
our past; or
C.  that embody the distinctive
characteristics of a type, period,
or method of construction, or
that represent a significant and
distinguishable entity whose
38.  16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(A) (2000).  See also 36
C.F.R. § 800.1 (2006).
39.  Declaration of Thomas F. King, Ph.D In
Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 9, Okinawa Dugong v.
Rumsfeld, No. C-03-4350 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter King Declaration] (emphasis added).
40.  Id.
41.  Id. ¶ 10 (citing National Register Bulletin
38, supra note 16, at 2, 14).
42.  36 C.F.R. § 800.16(l)(1) (2006).













components may lack individual
distinction; or
D.  that may have yielded, or
may be likely to yield, informa-
tion important in history or pre-
history.43
The National Register is not an
appropriate place to list purely intangible
cultural resources or those that have no
property referents.44 By its plain lan-
guage, the statute appears to preclude
any listing of animals because wildlife are
not “districts,” “buildings” or “structures.”
Even if animals are classified as “objects,”
they still do not possess “integrity of loca-
tion.”  Finally, wild animals are generally
not regarded as historic property.45
Although animal species cannot be
listed on the National Register, their pro-
tection is not precluded by the statute.
The cultural significance of a historic
property is derived from the role the prop-
erty plays in a community’s historically
rooted beliefs, customs, and practices.46
The land on which specific animal species
are found may be valued by traditional
societies because of the presence of cul-
turally significant wildlife.  Therefore, a
species’ habitat, though not the animal
itself, can be protected by the NHPA.
Some authority indicates that this is
indeed the case, as Bulletin 38 directs
agencies to evaluate all attributes that
give a site its significance, even those that
are intangible, in determining their eligi-
bility for the National Register.47
This interpretation fits easily within
the framework of the regulatory language.
A culturally significant natural landscape
or the specific location where significant
traditional events, activities, or cultural
observances have taken place may be
classified as a “site,” even if no structures
are in place.  Bulletin 38 explicitly states
that natural objects that are untouched by
human hands, such as trees or a rock out-
crop, may be eligible if they are associat-
ed with significant tradition or use.48
The intent of regulating agencies to
include wildlife in the analysis of historic
properties is evident in Preservation Brief
36.49 The Preservation Brief, which
describes the step-by-step process for
preserving historic and vernacular land-
scapes, defines cultural landscape as “a
geographic area, including both cultural
43.  National Register Criteria for Evaluation,
36 C.F.R. 60.4 (2006), available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/nr
b15/nrb15_2.htm.
44.  Id. at sec. IV.
45.  See Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th
Cir. 1988) (explaining that the federal government
does not “own” wild animals).  But see Okinawa
Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3123, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005)
(“Whether the government owns the property is
irrelevant to a determination of eligibility for the
National Register.”).
46.  National Register Bulletin 38, supra note
16, Introduction.
47.  Id. Every historic property is made up of
what the National Register calls “contributing” and
often “non-contributing” elements.  The plants and
animals within a natural cultural property usually
contribute to its significance.  U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, How to Complete the National
Registration Form, Nat’l Register Bulletin 16a
(1997) at Section III, available at
http://www.cr.nps.gov/nr/publications/bulletins/nr
b16a/nrb16a_III.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2006).
48.  National Register Bulletin 38, supra note
16, Determining Eligibility Step by Step.
49.  CHARLES A. BIRNBAUM, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
TECHNICAL PRESERVATION BRIEF 36: PROTECTING CULTURAL
LANDSCAPES: PLANNING, TREATMENT, AND MANAGEMENT OF
HISTORIC LANDSCAPES 2 (1994) (emphasis added), avail-
able at http://www.cr.nps.gov/hps/TPS/briefs/
brief36.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).













and natural resources and the wildlife or
domestic animals therein, associated with a
historic event, activity, or person or
exhibiting other cultural or aesthetic val-
ues.”50 It describes the ethnographic
landscape as
a landscape containing a variety
of natural and cultural resources
that associated people define as
heritage resources.  Examples are
contemporary settlements, reli-
gious sacred sites and massive
geological structures.  Small
plant communities, animals, sub-
sistence and ceremonial grounds
are often components.51
The presence of culturally significant
animals has been the basis of many list-
ings and determinations of eligibility for
the National Register, including several
animal habitats important in Native
American tribal histories.52 The National
Register includes three wildlife refuges:
the Lower Klamath Wildlife Refuge, the
Lake Merritt Wild Duck Refuge, and the
Pelican Island Wildlife Refuge.53 Other
sites “such as Devil’s Tower in Montana
[sic] and Massacre Canyon in Nebraska
are listed based on cultural traditions and
events associated with animals living at
the site.”54
Other examples of natural places
where animals contribute to cultural sig-
nificance and therefore are regarded as
eligible for the National Register include:
* The Mattaponi River in Virginia
. . . , regarded as eligible by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in
part because of the cultural
importance of the shad fisheries
to the Mattaponi and Pamunkey
Tribes.
* The Mushgigagamongsebe his-
toric district in Wisconsin,
regarded as eligible by the Corps
of Engineers as one of the last
places the Mole Lake Sokaogon
Community of Great Lakes
Ojibwe can carry out their tradi-
tional hunting and gathering.
* Mauna Kea in Hawaii, where
the weikiu bug, an insect that
lives at the mountain’s summit,
is regarded by Native Hawaiians
as a spiritually significant crea-
ture and contributes to the
mountain’s cultural importance.55
Finally, while no animals are listed
on the UNESCO World Heritage List, sev-
eral natural areas are included because
they provide marine mammal habitat or
breeding grounds.  In fact, Shark Bay of
Western Australia and the Great Barrier
Reef of Australia are included, in part,
because of their dugong populations.56
50.  Id. (emphasis added).
51.  Id. (emphasis added).
52.  Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123, at *24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2005).  See also King Declaration, supra note 39, ¶¶
12, 34-35.
53.  Okinawa Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3123, at *36 n.6.  
54.  Id.  See also Nat’l Park Serv., National
Register Information System, http://
www.nr.nps.gov/nrname1.htm  (follow “Nationwide
Resources Name” hyperlink; then enter “wildlife
refuge” in search field and select “Execute”) (last
visited Apr. 11, 2006).
55.  King Declaration, supra note 39, ¶ 35.
56.  Okinawa Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3123, at *26 n.4.  See also World Heritage Sites,
Shark Bay, http://www.wcmc.org.uk/protected_
areas/data/wh/sharkbay.html; World Heritage Site;
Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area,
http://www.wcmc.org.uk/protected_areas/data/wh/
gbrmp.html (last visited April 1, 2006).













III. Applying the NHPA to Dugong v.
Rumsfeld
According to a 2002 United Nations
Environment Programme report, the con-
struction of a military base near Henoko
could “destroy some of the most impor-
tant remaining dugong habitat in Japan,”
with “potentially serious” repercussions
for such a small population.57 The report
predicts that “unless measures are under-
taken to protect dugongs in the Okinawan
region they will soon be extinct in
Japanese waters.”58
As the seabed drilling in Henoko Bay
continues, and the protests of the
Okinawan community go unheeded, the
legal challenge to the military base is per-
haps the last resort to preserve the
Okinawan dugong and everything it
stands for in Okinawan culture.
A. The Cultural Significance of the
Okinawan Dugong
The dugong (dugong dugon) is a large
sea mammal distantly related to the man-
atee and the extinct Steller’s sea cow.59
The slow-moving shy giants grow up to 11
and a half feet long and can weigh as
much as 800 pounds.  The creatures, list-
ed as vulnerable to extinction on a global
scale by the World Conservation Union
(IUCN), are highly vulnerable to anthro-
pogenic influences because of their
dependence on sea grasses that are
restricted to coastal habitats often under
pressure from human activities.60
Because the dugong delay breeding when
there is a short supply of sea grass, habi-
tat conservation is a critical issue in pro-
tecting the species.61 While the dugong’s
range spans 37 countries and territories
from East Africa to Vanuatu, the animal is
believed to be represented by relict popu-
lations separated by large areas where its
numbers have been greatly reduced or
where it has already been extirpated.62
The waters surrounding the Japanese
Island of Okinawa are home to some of
the few remaining Okinawa dugong, a
rare, genetically isolated and unique
member of the dugong species.63 The
Okinawan waters form the creature’s
northernmost range, where it is believed
that only about fifty dugong remain.64
Dugongs are deeply significant to
Okinawan culture and have been for cen-
turies.65 Archeological excavations of
Okinawa have uncovered dugong bones
dating from before the 15th century.66 As
early as 1919, it is thought that the
dugong was designated as a “Natural
57.  U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP),
Dugong Status Report and Action Plans for Countries and
Territories, 42-43, U.N. Doc. UNEP/DEWA/RS.02-1
(2002) [hereinafter Dugong Status Report], available
at http://www.tesag.jcu.edu.au/dugong/doc/
dugongactplan.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2006).
58.  Id. at 46.
59.  Earthjustice, Background: The Dugongs vs. the
Department of Defense, http://www.earthjustice.org/
backgrounder/display.html?ID=103 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2006).
60.  Dugong Status Report, supra note 57, at 1.
61.  Id. (also noting that sea grass meadows
border only 10 percent of the Okinawan coastline).
62.  Id.
63.  See id. at 41; see also MARINE MAMMAL
COMM’N, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 129 (Mar.
31, 2002), available at http://www.mmc.gov/reports/
annual/pdf/2001annualreport.pdf.
64.  Earthjustice, Background: The Dugongs vs. the
Department of Defense, supra note 59.
65.  See Dugong Status Report, supra note 57, at
10 (“Dugongs are culturally significant to commu-
nities throughout their range.”).
66.  Id. at 41.













Symbol” under the Law to Protect
Historical and Scenic Sites, though the
Agency for Cultural Affairs denies this des-
ignation.67 There is no dispute, however,
that the Okinawa dugong has been listed
by the government since 1955 as a “Natural
Monument” under Japan’s “Cultural
Properties Protection Law.”68 In recogni-
tion of the historic and cultural signifi-
cance of the Okinawa dugong, the Ryukyu
Islands government issued a postage
stamp commemorating the Okinawa
dugong in 1966, describing it as “Natural
Monument Dugong (Mermaid).”69
Okinawan oral history demonstrates
the cultural importance of the dugong as it
is regularly associated with traditional
Okinawan creation mythology.  The
dugong, according to some traditional
myths, is the progenitor of the local peo-
ple.70 In one such myth a dugong princess
and a short-finned whale boy gave birth to
an animal with a human form.  That child
became the ancestor of Yabuchi Island
and the progenitor of the people of
Yakena, an island in the Okinawa prefec-
ture.  In another story, a naked man and
woman became curious about sex after
observing a pair of mating dugongs and,
later, mimicked their behavior.71 Their
decedents are today’s Okinawans.
Not only has the dugong regularly
appeared in the oral mythology of the
Okinawan people in creation myths, but
also have long been revered by native
Okinawans as “sirens” or “mermaids” who
bring friendly warnings of tsunamis.72
Legends also attribute the power to create
tsunamis to dugongs.73
In past centuries, dugong meat was
traditionally offered to royalty as sacred
food and medicine.74 Royalty and com-
mon people both used dried dugong to
help ease the pain of childbirth.75
Carvings made from dugong rib bones
have been found throughout Okinawa.76
The most common is a carving of a but-
terfly, which is believed to take the spirit
of the dead to another world.77 Dugong-
bone ornaments and tools as much as
3500 years old have been found in
Okinawa.78 Scholars believe that the peo-
ple who used these objects considered
them to contain spiritual power.79
Hunters traditionally chose dugong
bones for use as hunting tools presumably
because of their belief that they were
imbued with magic that would aid in their
quest.80 Until less than a century ago,
prayers to the dugong were considered
essential to successful fishing expedi-
tions.81 One legendary fishing practice had
young men expose their penises to attract
the dugong, which they considered a mer-
maid spirit, and then try to capture it.82
67.  See id. at 43.
68.  See id.
69.  See id.
70.  Declaration of Isshu Maeda in Support of
Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss at ¶¶ 6-7, Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No.




73.  Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 22.
74.  Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
75.  Id.
76.  Dugong Status Report, supra note 57, at 43.
77.  Id.
78.  Maeda Declaration, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 13-20.
79.  Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.
80.  Id. ¶ 20.
81.  Id. ¶¶ 26-30.
82.  Id.













Dugongs continue to play a role in
Okinawan spiritual and cultural practices,
including folk songs and religious cere-
monies.83 Because of its cultural signifi-
cance, the Okinawa dugong is listed as a
protected “natural monument” on the
Japanese Register of Cultural Properties,
established under Japan’s “Law for the
Protection of Cultural Properties.”84
B. The Equivalence of U.S. and
Japanese Historic Preservation Laws
The NHPA applies to “properties”
that are listed on another country’s equiv-
alent to the U.S. National Register.85 The
Japanese Register of Cultural Properties is
considered by Japanese and American
legal scholars to be equivalent to the U.S.
National Register.86 The authorization for
the Japanese Register is the Japanese Law
for the Protection of Cultural Properties,
which seeks to “preserve and utilize cul-
tural properties, so that the culture of the
Japanese people may be furthered and a
contribution made to the evolution of
world culture.”87 This is the only law in
Japan concerned with protecting cultural-
ly significant properties.  No other law in
Japan could feasibly be considered an
equivalent to the NHPA.88 One of the
types of “properties” protected by the
Japanese law is “Natural Monuments,”
which is limited to wild animal popula-
tions that have special cultural signifi-
cance.89 The Japanese Law indicates that
“animals (including their habitats, breed-
ing places and summer and winter
resorts)” may be designated as protected
cultural properties.90 Japanese law expert
Sekine Takamichi91 explained that “like
the NPHA, the only objective of the
Japanese Cultural Protection Law is to
protect objects of cultural value; species
with no independent cultural value are
not eligible for listing under the Japanese
Cultural Protection Law, no matter how
endangered they might be.”92 Japan has
promulgated other laws for the protection
of flora and fauna for their biological sig-
nificance.  The dugong is also protected
under Japan’s equivalent to the
Endangered Species Act: the Law for the
Conservation of Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora.
C. The Ruling
On March 1, 2005, the district court
issued its ruling on Okinawa Dugong v.
Rumsfeld.93 The court dismissed the
defendant’s motion to dismiss and
motion for summary judgment on the
issue of the applicability of the National
Historic Preservation Act to the dugong
affected by the proposed military base.94
83.  Id. ¶¶ 26-34.
84.  Declaration of Sekine Takamichi in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 16, Okinawa Dugong v.
Rumsfeld, No. C-03-4350 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2004)
[hereinafter Takamichi Declaration].
85.  16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2000).
86.  See Takamichi Declaration, supra note 86, ¶
2; Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350, 2005
U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123, at *68, (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005).
87.  Takamichi Declaration, supra note 86, ¶ 7.
88.  See id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
89. Id. ¶ 9.
90.  Id. ¶ 8.
91.  Sekine Takamichi is a member of the
Japanese Environmental Lawyers Federation.  He
lectures and publishes articles on Japanese, U.S.,
and international law.
92.  Takamichi Declaration, supra note 86, at ¶ 12.
93.  Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005).
94.  Id. at *68.
95.  Id.













The court considered, among other issues,
whether Japan’s Cultural Preservation Law
is equivalent to the NHPA and whether the
dugong could be considered “property” as
defined by the NHPA.95
The defendants argued that the
Japanese law could not be considered
equivalent to the National Register because
the Japanese law provides protection for
both inanimate and animate things, where-
as the U.S. Register “provides no legal
recognition or protection whatever for any
animal species.”96 The court rejected this
argument by explaining that “by employing
the word ‘equivalent,’ section 470a-2 does
not require that the National Register and
the foreign list in question be identical.”97
The court determined that a requirement
that the two lists be identical would contra-
dict the international scope of the provision.
The court explained: “To require that foreign
lists include only those types of resources
which are of cultural significance in the
United States would defy the basic proposi-
tion that just as cultures vary, so too will
their equivalent legislative efforts to pre-
serve their culture.”98 The defendant’s read-
ing would render the provision meaningless
because no other country will provide for
the same identification and scope of protec-
tion as the U.S.  The court ultimately looked
at the Japanese law’s function of protecting
cultural resources as being equivalent to the
U.S. National Register.
The court noted that the presence of
culturally significant animals has been the
basis of many listings on the National
Register in reasoning that “the statutes
demonstrate an equivalent commitment
to protecting significant bridges between
human culture and history, on the one
hand, and wildlife on the other.”99 The
court also noted that both statutes “have
evolved in a similar direction towards
greater inclusiveness of natural, as well as
cultural, places and things.”100
The second argument raised by
defendants is that even if the Japanese
law is equivalent, the dugong need not be
considered because the language of sec-
tion 470a-2 only requires that “properties”
on an applicable country’s equivalent of
the National Register be taken into
account.  The dugong, they argue, cannot
be understood as property within the
NHPA’s statutory scheme.  To evaluate
this claim, this court looked to the defini-
tions within the NHPA.  The statute does
not define the term “property” but does
define “historic property” as “any prehis-
toric or historic district, site, building,
structure, or object included in, or eligible
for inclusion on the National Register,
including artifacts, records, and material
remains related to such a property or
resource.”101 However, section 470a-2
does not refer to “historic property” and
instead uses the term “property.”  The
court concluded that the term “historic
property” with its defined categories
applies only to domestic activities, and
requiring otherwise would conflict with
the statute’s explicit reference to foreign
96.  Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at ¶ 15,
Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C-03-4350 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 4, 2004).
97.  Okinawa Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123,
at *20.
98.  Id. at *22.
99.  Id.
100.  Id. at *24 (citing King Declaration, supra
note 39, at ¶¶ 9-14, 45(b)).
101.  16 U.S.C. § 470w-5 (2000).  See also Hoonah
Indian Ass’n v. Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir.
1999).













law.  The court pointed to legislative his-
tory to determine that Congress intended
that a different standard for domestic and
international provisions of the law be
used, noting that Congress acknowledged
that the UNESCO convention that gave
rise to section 470a-2 “leaves it to each
participating nation to identify and delin-
eate the meritorious heritage properties
situated in its own territory.”102
The court then addressed whether the
dugong could be classified as property.  In
deciding how the section 470a-2 meant to
define “property,” the court looked to the
existing definition of “historic property”
and removed the reference to American
history to conclude that property is simply
a “district, site, building, structure, or
object.”  An object is defined as “a materi-
al thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural,
historical or scientific value that may be,
by nature or design, moveable yet related
to a specific setting or environment.”103
The court found that the plaintiffs demon-
strated that the dugong could be classified
as property because
[t]he dugong is indisputably a
“material thing,” as opposed to
something of a spiritual or intel-
lectual nature . . . the dugong
possesses “functional, aesthetic,
cultural, historical or scientific
value,” particularly of special
cultural significance in Okinawa
. . . and there can be no dispute
that the Okinawan dugong is
“moveable yet related to a spe-
cific setting or environment,”
namely Henoko Bay.104
The court dismissed out of hand defen-
dant’s contentions that dugong are not
property because of the Ninth Circuit’s rul-
ing in Christy v. Hodel105 that state and feder-
al governments cannot “own” wild ani-
mals.106 The court found that whether the
government owns the property is irrelevant
to a determination of eligibility for the
National Register, as is whether or not the
object is owned at all.107 The court found
the case to be analogous to Hatmaker v.
Georgia Department of Transportation, which held
that an unaltered oak tree of significance in
Native American history was potentially eli-
gible for the National Register.108
The court considered and rejected
several additional claims including the
allegation that Henoko Bay is not suffi-
ciently bounded or defined to be protect-
ed, and that the military base relocation
was not a federal undertaking.109
D. Potential Effects of the Court’s Ruling
In determining the equivalence of the
Japanese Statute to the NHPA, the court
noted that “[t]he presence of culturally
significant animals has been the basis of
many listings and determinations of eligi-
bility for the National Register, including
several animal habitats important in
Native American tribal histories.”110 The
102. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2005).
103.  36 C.F.R. § 60.3(j).
104.  Okinawa Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3123, at *31-32.
105.  857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988).
106.  Okinawa Dugong, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis
3123, at *35.
107.  Id.  See also 36 C.F.R. § 60.2.
108.  973 F. Supp. 1047 (M.D. Ga. 1995).
109.  Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123, at *37, *42 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 1, 2005).
110.  Id. at *24.













court went even further, stating that the
National Register lists properties solely
for their biological value, without refer-
ence to an explicit cultural dimension.111
As proof of this proposition, the court
points to several wildlife refuges on the
National Register which are listed without
reference to any cultural or historical
links.112 Implicit in this reasoning is that
the refuges were protected only for the
cultural significance of the species that
reside within, not for any independent
cultural values that may be found in the
physical space listed.
The court’s ruling is important for two
reasons.  First, it acknowledges the NHPA’s
potential use in protecting wildlife habitat
in the U.S. and secondly, it paves the way
for the Act to be applied directly to federal
actions affecting culturally significant
species abroad.  Traditional groups should
be aware of the expansive reading the court
gives the NHPA, and use the statute to pro-
pose listing habitat of culturally significant
wildlife.  For example, an area of a stream
used for traditional salmon fishing may be
protected, not for any features on the land,
but merely for the presence of a culturally
important species.113 Such use of the
statute may have far-reaching implications
as it may protect culturally significant
species that are not endangered or threat-
ened but are facing local extirpations near
indigenous populations.  If such habitat is
listed, a federal agency will have to under-
go a NEPA-like process and take any
adverse effect on the habitat-dependent
species into consideration before proceed-
ing with the action.
Furthermore, because of the court’s
willingness to find equivalency between
the U.S. and Japanese laws, in the future
the U.S. will have to take a closer look at
their actions abroad to determine if it may
affect any property or animal protected by
that country’s cultural preservation laws.
The court referenced Cultural Resource
Specialist Thomas King’s Declaration
which noted that “[s]pecies are entitled to
protection for their cultural value in many
nations.  Some, like Japan, protect cultur-
ally significant species directly; others,
like the United States, protect culturally
significant species by protecting the loca-
tions in which that significance is
expressed.”114 A quick review of cultural
preservation laws of other countries sup-
ports this view.  Canada lists “heritage
animals” on the basis of a species’ historic
and cultural value.115 Denmark’s program
for cultural heritage in planning protects
cultural landscapes which it defines as
representing “the combined works of
nature and humans.”116 Australia’s
Register of the National Estate explicitly
covers both cultural and natural
111. Id.
112.  Id.  This is a reference to the listing of the
Lower Klamath Wildlife Refuge, the Lake Merritt
Wild Duck Refuge, and the Pelican Island Wildlife
Refuge.
113.  However, in Hoonah Indian Ass’n v. Morrison,
170 F.3d 1223, 1231 (1999), the court found that
properties listed on the National Register must be
more concretely bounded and defined than a gen-
eral area.
114. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350,
2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 3123, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
2005).
115.  See Government of Newfoundland &
Labrador, Chapter H-2.1: An Act Respecting the
Protection of Heritage Animals, http://
www.gov.nf.ca/hoa/chapters/1996/H02-1.c96.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
116.  See Danish Forest and Nature Agency,
Cultural Heritage in Planning, http://www.sns.dk/
udgivelser/2001/87-7279-298-1/default_eng.htm
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006).













resources, and recognizes that cultural
values are linked closely to plant and ani-
mal populations.117
The NHPA can be applied to species
abroad when there is a U.S. undertaking
(which may include U.S. funding or sup-
port), there is a culturally significant
species that may be affected by the U.S.
action present, and where the species is
protected under that country’s laws for its
cultural importance.  While international
use may be limited, the NHPA is another
tool human rights activists and environ-
mentalists can use to benefit both local
communities and species.
E. The Current Situation
After losing their initial court battle
and pressured by long-term protests, the
U.S. Department of Defense and the
Japanese government formally aban-
doned the initial Henoko Bay military
base plan.118 On October 29, 2005, the
U.S. and Japan released a proposal to
substitute the Henoko Bay airbase with a
smaller facility on the adjacent Marine
base, Camp Schwab.119 The new propos-
al includes filling in part of Oura Wan Bay
and a small section of Henoko Bay.120
While the abandonment of the
Henoko Bay plan is a success for dugong
supporters, many still view the new plan as
unacceptable.121 Refilling portions of
Oura Wan and Henoko Bays will destroy
habitat essential for dugong survival and
recovery.122 Moreover, the new location is
virtually inaccessible to community mem-
bers, who need to be given clearance to
enter the Camp Schwab Marine base if they
are to continue their protests.123
Construction in the new proposed area
would result in severe soil erosion into
Henoko and Oura Wan Bays which will
diminish the sea grass beds vital to dugong
survival.124 Finally, some think that the
new proposal was adopted in part to curtail
the protestors’ use of canoes to stall con-
struction efforts, as the sea in Oura Wan is
rough and inaccessible to small boats.125
Earthjustice, the lead organization
bringing the challenge, has indicated that
it will continue its lawsuit.126 However,
most are hopeful that the tremendous will
and strength exhibited by the people of
Okinawa in fighting for the preservation of
the dugong will force the U.S. and
Japanese governments to withdraw all
plans of building in the Henoko region.127
117.  See Australian Heritage Commission,
Criteria for the Register of the National Estate,
http://www.ahc.gov.au/register/furtherinfo/crite-
ria.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
118. 2005 in Review, Okinawa: From Fighting Wars to
Taking Part in Disaster Relief, an Eventful Year, STARS AND
STRIPES, Dec. 31, 2005, available at http://
www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=&arti-
cle=33184&archive=true (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).
119.  Id.
120.  Id.
121.  Sarah Buckley, Okinawa Base Battle Resolved,
BBC NEWS, Oct. 26, 2005, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacif-
ic/4357098.stm (last visited Apr. 9, 2006).
122.  Earthjustice, Okinawa Air Base Deal Still
Controversial, Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.earthjustice.org
/news/display.html?ID=1069 (last visited Mar. 26,
2006).
123.  Buckley, supra note 121.
124.  Conversation with members of the
Association to Protect Northernmost Dugong, in
San Francisco, Cal. (Feb. 3, 2006).
125.  Id.
126.  Earthjustice, Urgent Cases: Okinawa
Dugong and Proposed Military Base, http://earth-
justice.org/urgent/display.html?ID=154 (last visit-
ed Apr. 9, 2006).
127. Earthjustice, Okinawa Air Base Deal Still
Controversial, Oct. 26, 2005, http://www.earthjustice.org/
news/display.html?ID=1069 (last visited Mar. 26, 2006).














The movement toward greater inclu-
siveness of cultural preservation laws took
another step forward with the district
court’s acceptance that wildlife may be
protected under the National Historic
Preservation Act.  This acceptance,
already alluded to in several agency docu-
ments and guidelines, has now been pre-
liminarily confirmed with the ruling in
Dugong v. Rumsfeld.  The court’s reasoning
will help pave the way for traditional
groups to petition for the protection of
habitat crucial to the survival of culturally
significant animals, both in the U.S. and
abroad.
